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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ADA JONES,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA BALDWIN,
Case No. 960423-CA
Defendants/Appellants.

JL

SUGGESTION

OF PEATB

In Ms. Jones1 brief in this matter she suggested at footnote
1 that David Baldwin had passed away subsequent to the filing of
his initial brief.

Attached hereto is a copy of Mr. Baldwin's

death certificate.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure

38(a) "If the deceased party has no representative, any party may
suggest the death on the record and proceedings shall then be had
as the court may direct."

Mrs. Baldwin has informed the

undersigned counsel of record that no personal representative for
probate purposes has been appointed for her late husband because
of the de minimus

nature of his estate.

Defendants!/Appellantsf

counsel suggests that the ends of justice in this case would be
best served by allowing the appeal to proceed unhindered by the
death of Mr. Baldwin.

XL

ARGUMENT
Counsel for Ms. Jones has attempted to elevate the standard

of review from the "erroneous" standard, applicable to errors of
law as set forth in Baldwins1 initial brief, to an "abuse of
discretion" standard.

Ms. Jones has sought to do this by arguing

everything from the context of the relief ordered by the lower
court.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Reed

v. Alvey,

610

P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) :
In cases of equity this court is authorized to
exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both
questions of law and questions of fact. While we have
recognized the trial court's advantageous position in
relation to questions of fact, when the trial court has
based its rulings upon a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would
have produced a different result, the party adversely
affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a
proper adjudication under correct principles of law.1
Ms. Jones has spent some effort in arguing that the lower
court had the power to reverse the initial decision granting
summary judgment to the Baldwins.
point.

There is no argument on that

The thrust of Baldwins1 argument related to the Motion

for Summary Judgment is not that the court could not change its
mind, but that the initial decision was correct and the
subsequent reversal was incorrect as a matter of law.

As is

stated in the prior brief, Judge Tibbsf decision on the Motion
for Summary Judgment was wrong as a matter of law and all the
subsequent determinations by the lower court depended upon that

1

See also Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah

1979)

2

mistake of law and were therefore themselves erroneous and
subject to reversal.
In other words, the stratagem of asking for equitable relief
is not the shield for errors of law that Plaintiff urges.

As is

discussed in Baldwins' initial brief, the lower court's
determination to grant an equitable remedy is founded exclusively
upon errors of law.
Plaintiff's next mis-statement of the issues and arguments
relates to the trial court's refusal of evidence and even a
proffers of the Defendants the Baldwins.

Ms. Jones cites

numerous cases for the proposition that the intent of the parties
is to be ascertained from within the four corners of the
documents if that is possible, if not, the secondary source of
intention is from contemporaneous documents which are part of the
same transaction, and only if the first two fail utterly is
extrinsic or parol evidence admitted to prove intentions of the
parties.
Bank v.

That is a correct principle of law.
Tanner,

In Utah

Valley-

636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981) at page 1061 the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that
the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the
content of the instrument itself, the rationale for
the rule being to preserve the sanctity of
written instruments.
Each contract provision is
to be considered in relation to all of the
others, with the view toward giving effect to
all and ignoring none.
It is only when an
ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by
an objective and reasonable interpretation of
the contract as a whole that resort may be had
to the use of extrinsic evidence.
Applying the
foregoing legal principles to the case at hand we deem
the trial judge to have erred in permitting the
introduction of extrinsic evidence. (Citations
omitted, emphasis added.)

3

Baldwins1 thrust with respect to the lower court's rulings
on evidence is not to assert that extrinsic evidence should have
been admitted.

On the contrary, the lower court determine to do

that in its erroneous final ruling on summary judgment.
Virtually the entirety of Plaintiff's case consisted of extrinsic
parol evidence.

Even though the courtfs determination to allow

parol evidence was in error, it is grossly inappropriate to allow
extrinsic evidence from only one party, in this case the
Plaintiff, if extrinsic evidence is to be admitted.

Fundamental

fairness requires that both sides be allowed to offer parol
evidence if either is.
A.

That was not the case in the trial below.

MIS-STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

At page 13 of Ms. Jones' brief, the first full paragraph on
that page, Ms. Jones asserts that Defendant Gloria Baldwin
"voiced no objection to the new agreement".

The record citation

for that proposition does not support the proposition.

At

transcript page 338 (record page 94 6) Mrs. Baldwin is being
examined by Plaintiff's attorney.

In the course of that

examination and subsequent cross-examination by her own attorney,
Mrs. Baldwin states and then re-states that she did communicate
to the Plaintiff that she objected to the new agreement.

While

Mrs. Baldwin is less than clear on the timing of those objections
and whether there was one such statement of objections or many,
it is definitely not clear that she voiced no objection.
the opposite is true.

Just

(Tr. 338-341, R. 946-949).

The other major mis-step in Plaintiff's "statement of the
case" section is the statement in the second paragraph on page 14

4

which is:
The trial court found that the 1992 agreement was
an extension or modification of the 1984 agreement and
that the terms of the prior agreement carried forward,
and that Ms. Jones was therefore entitled to apply her
equity credit against the purchase price of the
property.
That statement is a fair re-statement of the cited source,
but demonstrates one of the fundamental problems with the
decision below, i.e., it is internally inconsistent.

If the

19921 agreement is an extension and modification of the 1984

That agreement reeds as follows:
AGREEMENT
This agreement made & entered into this 1st day of Aug. 1992 by
and between David Baldwin hereinafter referred to as the "grantor" and
Ada Jones, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee" witnesseth.
That the grantor hereby grants the use of to grantee certain
restaurant (or cafe1) and motel (or gift shop) property located in
Boulder Utah, Garfield County, State of Utah, upon the following terms
& conditions
1.
The term of this agreement shall be the first day to the last
day of each month, with rent due by the first day of each month.
Grantor covenants and warrants that he has full right & authority to
enter into this agreement.
2.
During the term of this agreement, the rent to be paid by the
grantee shall be the sum of $400.00. Thereafter, the amount shall be
subject to re-negotiation among the parties, and with a 15 day grace
period on rent payment.
*3. At any time during this agreement the grantee may have the
first right of refusal to purchase said property.
A.
The purchase price shall be fixed, at that // time, at a fair
market value, as established by the opinions of three (3) independent
appraisers, to be selected by mutual agreement of the parties hereto.
B.
The remaining terms of such purchase shall be established at
that time by mutual agreement of the parties hereto.
4.
In addition to the rental specified herein, grantee agrees to
pay all utilities and water charges, and shall be entitled to the use
of the commercial water connection to the property.
5.
Grantee shall be entitled to make improvement upon the
premises and property, and agree to maintain them in good repair and
order, with prior approval from Grantor.
6.
Grantor shall pay the real property taxes upon the premises &
property.
7.
Grantee shall retain and keep in force at all times adequate
insurance necessary to protect their interest upon said premises.
8.
If grantee should desire to subgrant at any time it must be
with prior approval of grantor in writing.
9.
At reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, grantor shall
be entitled to inspect the premises, and to perform necessary repairs

5

agreement, then the judgment below cannot stand.

The 1992

agreement expressly replaces the option language of that earlier
agreement with a "first right of refusal".

The 1984 agreement,

standing by itself, provided for a pure option with a price
determination by independent appraisers but with a minimum and
maximum price range.

The corresponding terms of the 1992

agreement specifically exclude any option language as well as the
minimum and maximum price ranges.

If the 1992 agreement extends

and modifies the 1984 agreement, the only principled reading of
the consolidated agreement is the option has been removed and

// and maintenance thereon.
10.
In the event of default under the terms of this grant,
grantor reserves the right, after due notice of such default, to
terminate this grant; to re-enter and take possession of the premises;
and to re-let the same, and apply the proceeds thereof to the
obligation of the grantee hereunder. In that event the grantee agrees
to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises, and to restore them
to a good or better condition as when they took possession thereof,
normal wear and tear expected.
11.
If either party hereto, for good cause, desires to terminate
this grant, they must provide written notice in due time prior to the
date of such proposed termination.
12.
Grantee agrees to comply with all applicable federal, state,
and local laws and ordinances.
13.
If legal action is taken to enforce the terms of this
agreement, the defaulting party shall pay all costs incurred in
connection with such action, including reasonable attorney1s fees.
14.
This agreement contains the entire agreement between the
parties, and may only be // modified, in writting, signed by both
parties.
15.
This agreement shall be binding upon, and shall inure to the
benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective heirs, legal
representatives, successors, and assigns.
Dated this 12th day of Aug. 1992.
Grantor
Grantee
Continuation of #1 above, this agreement shall continue in effect
for one year, renewable at that time for one year terms up to five
years, as long as everything is current and agreed to by both parties.
Grantor agrees to maintain adequate insurance on premises.
(Notary)
Grantor
David Baldwin
Grantee
Ada A. Jones
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that the retention of the appraiser language is made as a safety
check, for Plaintiff's benefit, on the bona fides
which Baldwins might be willing to accept.

of the offer

The decision below

and Plaintiff!s argument require that the amendment in 1992
govern with respect to the deletion of the price range but the
original 1984 agreement govern with respect to whether an option
or a right of first refusal is being offered.

The only

"principle" that can explain such ala carte selection of terms is
the principle of advance determination of which party should win.
Such a decision is not sustainable in law or equity.
Another reason why the court's finding and conclusion no. 7
mandates reversal is that it contradicts the express terms of
Exhibit 2, the 1992 agreement.

The 1992 agreement is

unquestionably the later of the two.

Paragraph 14 of that

agreement says "This agreement contains the entire agreement
between the parties and may only be modified, in writing, signed
by both parties."

That integration clause has to be completely

ignored in order to allow the result below to stand.
Mining

Co. v.

Utah Division

of State

Lands

and Forestry,

Plateau
802 P.2d

720 (Utah 1990) at page 725 states:
"The basic rule of contract interpretation
is that the intent of the parties is to be
ascertained from the content of the instrument
itself. . . .
Each contract provision is to be
considered in relation to all of the others,
with a view toward giving effect to all and
ignoring none." Utah Valley
Bank v. Tanner,
63 6 P.2d
1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981); Sears v. Riemersma,
655
P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982).
The plain meaning
rule preserves the intent of the parties and
protects the contract against judicial revision.
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica,
Inc.,
657 P.2d 743,
749 (Utah 1982); Utah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061.
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[4] [5] Parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of a contract
which is clear on its face.
Faulkner
v.
Farnsworth,
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
But if a
contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to
explain the parties1 intent. Colonial
Leasing
Co. v.
Larsen

Bros.

Constr.

Co.,

731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah

1986); Faulkner,
665 P.2d at 1293.
Whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law which
must be decided before parol evidence is
admitted. Faulkner,
665 P.2d at 12 93. "[A] motion
for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the
parties intended."
Id.
[6] [7] When ambiguity does exist, the intent
of the parties is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury.
Colonial
Leasing
Co., 731
P. 2d at 488.
Failure to resolve an ambiguity by
determining the partiesf intent from parol
evidence is error.

Winegar

v.

Smith

Inv.

Co.,

5 90

P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1979).
If a contract is
ambiguous, the court may consider the parties1 actions
and performance as evidence of the parties1 true
intention. Zeese
v.
(Utah 1975); Bullfrog

Estate
of
Marina,

Siegel,
Inc.
v.

534 P.2d 85, 90
Lentz,
28 Utah

2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972); Bullough
v.
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 309, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1965).
[8] The trial court held the royalty provision
ambiguous because the amount due was "based on several
factors not immediately capable of definitive
determination."
However, a contract provision is
not necessarily ambiguous just because one party
gives that provision a different meaning than
another party does.

Buehner

Block

Co.

v. UWC

Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
To
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions
the parties must each be tenable.
See,
e.g.,
Grow v.

Marwick

Dev.,

Inc.,

of

621 P. 2d 1249, 1252 (Utah

1980).
Even if a provision is not "immediately
capable of definitive determination," that does not
necessarily make the provision unenforceable. (Emphasis
added.)
The decision below has violated every one of those
principles of contract interpretation.

The 1992 agreement

expressly states that it is an integration.

That provision was

ignored in order to add arbitrarily selected terms from the 1984

8

agreement.

Instead of construing the provisions related to sale

in the 1992 agreement in a way which gives meaning to all terms,
i.e., that it is a right of first refusal with appraisers
available as a reality check on the bona fides of any offers
proposed to be accepted, the court adopted an interpretation
which makes portions of the sale related clauses meaningless and
also requires other sections of the contract to be ignored.
Instead of determining whether or not the contract was
ambiguous before deciding to admit parol evidence, the court
below allowed the Plaintiff to testify what she believed the
contract meant and then determined the contract was ambiguous in
order to tailor a result to that testimony.

If an ambiguity did

exist, instead of allowing the intent of the parties to be
determined by the jury, the court below made all the
determinations as to the intent of the parties and allowed only a
partial question of damages to be determined by the jury.
In addition, the court's determination of ambiguity is
itself legally erroneous because there are not two reasonable
interpretations.

The 1992 right of refusal provision, standing

by itself, is clear and unequivocal, is capable of ready
enforcement, and is not missing any essential terms.

While

Baldwins1 interpretation gives meaning to every term of the 1992
agreement, both Mr. Jones' and the court's interpretation require
that portions of the later agreement be ignored and the portions
of a prior agreement supersede corresponding portions of the
later agreement.

Such an arbitrary construction of contracts is

untenable and unreasonable.

9

E^

REJECTION

INTERPRETATION

OF

THE RULES

OF

CONTRACT

IS A FQRTIQRI AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

As is discussed above, Plaintiff1s attempt to increase the
standard of review in this case is both a departure from what was
actually appealed in this matter and unwarranted by the law.
in the case of Ferris

v.

Jennings,

As

595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979)

the case below involved an equitable remedy but that equitable
remedy was given as a result of erroneous contract
interpretation, which is a matter of law.

As the Supreme Court

stated:
[1] [2] We decide as we do herein in awareness
that, inasmuch as specific performance is an equitable
remedy, the trial judge has considerable discretion in
determining whether equity and good conscience require
that the relief be granted. (FN2) But it is equally
true that when the trial court has based his ruling
upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law,
where a correct one may have produced a different
result, the party adversely affected thereby is
entitled to have the error rectified and a proper
adjudication under correct principles of law.
(Citations omitted.)
The trial in the court below was not a full trial on the
merits as framed in the Complaint.

Judge Tibbs! order granting

partial summary judgment to Ms. Jones made a number of findings
that foreclosed large areas of proof and argument to the
Baldwins.

Finding no. 2 of that order erroneously interpreted

the contract.

Finding no. 4 of that order erroneously determined

a pricing scheme based upon the previous error.

Finding no. 7

foreclosed issues with respect to the property boundaries based
upon the previous two errors.

Only findings 8 through 11,

dealing with definiteness of value, method of conveyance,

10

environmental encumbrances and water rights were left open for
trial. Those were all matters which the court expressly stated in
its order were not expressly part of the contract and which
therefore could only be addressed by extrinsic parol evidence.
The court having therefore ordered that only parol evidence would
be heard prior to present counsel becoming involved in the case,
the case was lost to Baldwins before the trial began.
Continental

Bank & Trust

Co. v. Bybee,

306 P.2d 773, 775

(Utah 1957) states the sequence of steps which should be
undertaken by a court in determining the meaning of the contract.
The court below violated each of those rules starting with the
decision on summary judgment.

Nevertheless, even if it had been

proper to admit parol evidence regarding the four terms that the
court was willing to have a trial on, the court's decision was
demonstrably incorrect as a matter of law.

As Justice Howe of

the Utah Supreme Court stated in his dissenting opinion to
Hackford

v.

Snow,

657 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Utah 1982) parol evidence

is admissible to apply, not to supply, a description of lands in
the contract:
Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of
identifying the description contained in the writing
with its location upon the ground, but not for the
purpose of ascertaining and locating the land about
which the parties negotiated, and supplying a
description thereof which they had omitted from the
writing. There is a clear distinction between the
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the
purpose of identifying the land described and applying
the description to the property and that of supplying
and adding to a description insufficient and void on
its face.
The above is merely a particular formulation of the hornbook
law principle that parol evidence, when admissible, is admissible

11

only to explain and not to alter or amend the terms of the
contract.

The decision below, both in the summary judgment order

and by the terms of the findings of fact and conclusions of law
implying a "reasonable" price, a "reasonable" environmental rule,
a "reasonable" water distribution, and a "reasonable" property
description, evidence that terms were being added to the
contract, not merely explained.

As is mentioned in Baldwins1

prior brief, the Plaintiff expressly stated that none of those
terms had even been discussed between the parties prior to the
"tender" that gave rise to this litigation.

The fact the terms

with respect to water, environmental issues, boundaries, and
price were absent from the 1992 agreement is consistent with the
right of first refusal.

A right of first refusal provides a

party with the opportunity to purchase property upon exactly the
same terms and conditions as a seller would be willing to sell to
others for.

In other words, all the terms that were "missing"

from the 1992 agreement would have been supplied by the offer
which was subject to the right of first refusal.

This is yet

another example of how the court below ignored the interpretation
which made the contract at issue complete and sensible,
preferring an interpretation which required a contract to be
created from scratch by the court.
The court's determination with respect to environmental
issues is directly contradictory to paragraph 12 of the 1992
agreement.

That paragraph states "Grantee [Ms. Jones] agrees to

comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and
ordinances."

That provision places the burden of compliance with

12

environmental laws upon Ms. Jones.

Nonetheless, because the

court was creating an agreement from scratch, that provision was
ignored in the court's decision.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the "missing terms of the
contract were not supplied by legal presumptions, established
customs, other rules of law, and evidence of the conduct of the
parties,11 they were established by arbitrary fiat.

£L
VIOLATES

TURNING A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL INTO AN OPTION
EVERY PRINCIPLE

OF CONTRACT

CONSTRUCTION.

The first rule of contract interpretation is the document
should be checked internally to determine if it is consistent and
makes sense.

There has been no showing below or in Plaintiff's

appeal brief, that the 1992 agreement is internally inconsistent
and irreconcilable.

Until such a showing is made, the court may

not look at extrinsic evidence at all.

As is discussed above,

the 1992 agreement can be interpreted within the four corners as
internally consistent in giving meaning to all terms.
Continental

Bank

& Trust

Co.

v.

Bybee,

306 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah

1957) specifically states "If the ambiguity can be reconciled
from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic
evidence should not be allowed."

(Citations omitted)

In other words, if the contract itself can be construed
consistently and without omitting any of its terms in only one
reasonable fashion, then the court may not go outside the
contract.

If there are two such reasonable interpretations if

the preferred interpretation can be determined from within the
contract itself, the court may still not go outside the contract.
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It is only when there are two interpretations which both give
effect to all parts of the contract and where there is nothing in
the contract itself which would allow the court to determine a
preference for those two reasonable interpretations that terms
outside the document itself may be examined.

The court below

skipped over those rules.
Even if the court had been justified in going outside the
1992 contract, the court was not justified in determining that
the contract offered an option.
Roberts,

Property

Assistance

Corp.

v.

768 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Restatement

2d of Contracts §25 (1981), states:
An option contract is fa promise which meets the
requirement for formation of a contract and limits the
promisor's power to revoke an offer1 ... two element
exist in such a contract: (1) an offer of sell, which
does not become a contract until accepted; and (2) a
contract to leave the offer open for a specified time.
..." (citations omitted)
There is no showing that any offer to sell was required to
be left open for a specified time.

In fact, Baldwins attempted

to introduce evidence that they had taken steps to terminate the
contract for default in accordance with this provision.

Baldwins

were prevented from having that evidence admitted. (See e.g.,

Tr.

568, R. 1149.)
In its argument that this court should look beyond the
"label" of right of first refusal to the substance, it is
interesting to note that all of the cases cited by Plaintiff hold
that an "option" so designated is, in each cited case, actually a
right of first refusal.

It is much less invasive to require a

party to sell property to a particular party but upon terms which

14

are acceptable to the seller, as is required with a right of
first refusal, than is an option whereby a party may force the
sale of the seller's property at any time.

Plaintiff has cited

neither fact nor law to support the imposition of an option in
violation of the express provisions of the 1992 contract.
The sole support for Plaintiff's argument that an option was
intended is their assertion that a mechanism for determining
price is not needed with a right of first refusal.

While it is

true that such a mechanism is not essential to a right of first
refusal, it was suggested by Baldwins that provision serves as a
safety valve to allow Ms. Jones to reform a "reality check" on
any offer.

Similarly, paragraph 3(b) of the 1992 agreement which

states, "The remaining terms of such purchase shall be
established at that time by mutual agreement of the parties
hereto" constitutes a safety valve for applying terms which may
not be included in an offer.

For example, some third party might

have offered the Baldwins $320,000.00 for all of their property
but not specified a payment term.

Assuming that offer was

acceptable to Baldwins, they would have to give a right of first
refusal to Ms. Jones upon all the specified terms.

Terms of

payment being an incidental term unspecified in the original
offer, it would be susceptible to negotiation between the
Baldwins and Ms. Jones.

If Ms. Jones believed that the

$320,000.00 offer was a straw man offer proposed as a sham by the
Baldwins, she could, under the terms of the 1992 agreement,
request a check on valuation by three appraisers.

The above

hypothetical demonstrates at least one interpretation which gives
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meaning to all of the terms at issue and therefore prevents the
acceptance of Plaintiff's argument.
On the other hand, if paragraph 3(a) and (b) of the 1992
agreement are interpreted to be an option, then paragraph 3 (b)
states that all of the terms except price must be subsequently
agreed to.

Therefore, the agreement is merely an agreement to

agree and cannot survive as an enforceable option.

EL

THE PRICE ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT WAS

ARBITRARILY

LOW.

Plaintiff cites the case of Kier

v.

Condrack,

25 Utah 2d

139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (Utah 1970) for the proposition that the
requirement for definite terms exist to do justice not to
"perpetrate an injustice.11

The only definite term on price that

had ever been discussed and agreed to between the parties was the
statement in the 1984 contract that the minimum purchase value of
the property would be $70,000.00.

Even though the 1984 agreement

contains a similar provision regarding appointment of three
appraisers, the court below was willing to bring forward the
option language but not the price language from that contract.
Assuming, arguendo, that the 1992 contract was not an integration
and was intended only to modify the 1984 agreement, there is
nothing in the 1992 agreement which indicates any desire to
eliminate the price range specified.

The court below has

arbitrarily substituted the indefinite term of valuation by
appraisers for the definite term of valuation by appraisers
within a range.

By removing the price floor which protected the

Baldwins and then placing liability for environmental concerns
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upon the Baldwins, giving Plaintiff credit for rent paid toward
the unwanted sale, awarding damages and attorney's fees, the
court below has not only confiscated the Baldwin's property, they
are making Baldwins pay to give it away.

To assert that the

Baldwins are the workers of injustice in that situation is an
Orwellian mis-statement.
£L

THE

DESCRIPTION

OF

THE

PROPERTY

ONLY BUILDINGS r NOT THE SPRRQVNPING

CONTEMPLATES

REALTY r

Plaintiff has cited numerous cases where a sales contract
referring to an address or to a farm or to some other readily
identifiable parcel of land was allowed to be enhanced to a meets
and bounds or other legal description.

Each of those cases

involved situations where there was no dispute about whether
there had been an agreement for sale of property and only
subsidiary issues, none material, were involved.

Even then,

however, the decisions were not without controversy as evidenced
by the dissenting opinions generated in those cases.
Nonetheless, the agreement at issue here does not fit the mold of
those cases.

Here the property is described merely as

!l

[A]

certain restaurant (or cafe) and motel (or gift shop) property
located in Boulder, Utah ...". The 1984 agreement refers only to
"certain restaurant and service station property located in
Boulder ..." . As is shown by Exhibit 11, the buildings, which are
the referenced description, encompass only the small part of the
entire parcel of property.

Furthermore, a large portion of the

property which is not covered by the buildings is behind the
operating area of the two buildings and therefore not essential

11

to their use.

In light of that, it is at least questionable,

particularly in light of the testimony of the Baldwins that they
used the unused portion of the property for ingress and egress
from their home, whether or not all of the parcel was covered by
the lease.
Here again this is an ambiguity that exists only if the 1992
contract is construed as Plaintiff desires.

If construed

according to its express terms a right of first refusal, the
extent of the property to be sold would be covered by the terms
of any offer which was otherwise acceptable to Baldwins.

JL
FROM

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT

ON GLORIA

BALDWIN'S

ABSENCE

THE CONTRACT DEPENDS UPON A MIS-STATEMENT,
The basis of Plaintiff's argument that David Baldwin could

have honored the contract as an agent for Gloria Baldwin depends
on their assertion of fact which is incorrect.

Mrs. Baldwin

testified that she expressly informed Ms. Jones on at least one,
if not several occasions, that she was opposed to the agreement.
A principal may not be bound by the acts of an agent where the
party seeking to rely on the agency relationship is aware that
the agent is acting outside the scope of his authority.

G,

ENVIRONMENTAL

REQUIREMENTS

ARE NOT

"LIENS OR

ENCUMBRANCES" ,
Ms. Jones asserts that is was proper to force the Baldwins
to absorb the cost of environmental compliance in order to get
"good and marketable title."

The definition of good and

marketable title supplied by Plaintiff!s brief includes only
adverse claims of ownership.

The requirement for environmental
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abatement is merely a cost which is associated with the property.
Violation of environmental laws does not result in forfeiture of
the property ownership, it merely results in the imposition of
fines.

Because environmental concerns do not constitute an

adverse claim of ownership, they do not hinder good and
marketable title.

The fact that it might be difficult to find

someone willing to pay money to acquire an environmental
liability does not in any way affect the chain of title.

IL

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT ADMITS

ORDER ON WATER

CONSTITUTES A LEGAL

THAT THE COURTTS
IMPOSSIBILITY.

Plaintiff's brief acknowledged that the water district
testified that there was no provision in place for splitting a
water share.

Plaintiff merely argues that because such a

provision may come into existence in the future that the court
was justified in ordering something which does not exist now.
Ordering the present delivery of something which does not now
exist but which only might exist in the future is, by definition,
a legal impossibility.
Plaintiff has also cited Utah Code Annotated §73-1-11 to the
effect that apurtenant water goes with the land unless it is
reserved.

If the 1992 contract is an option then a problem is

created since the water was apurtenant to both the residential
property and the commercial buildings.

If the 1992 contract was,

as stated, a right of first refusal, then the disposition of the
water right would be covered in the terms of the offer to be
accepted.

Here again the decision of the court below creates

problems and ambiguities which are not a part of the contract as
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drafted.

L

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT ON DAMAGES CONFUSES

APPLICABLE WITH INAPPLICABLE

LAW.

As is stated in Baldwins1 initial brief, damages are not
available in an equitable case because of the definitions of
money damages and equitable relief.

Plaintiff's citations of

cases on election of remedies are therefore inapposite.
Nonetheless, even if damages are conceptually available for delay
in providing an equitable remedy, they should not be available in
this case because the court did not consider any offset for
interest retained on funds as required by Eliason

v.

Watts,

615

P.2d 427 (Utah 1980) and because the lower court prevented
Baldwins from admitting evidence regarding default of Ms. Jones
that would have shown that the contract was terminated and that
therefore she was not entitled to any equitable remedy.

The

court also precluded the introduction of evidence regarding
quantum of those damages from the Baldwins.

U L

CONCLUSION ANP RELIEF SOUGHT
The result below started down the wrong road both legally

and equitably when Judge Mower was replaced and his decision on
summary judgment was reversed.

That decision was based on a

legally wrong interpretation of contract and legally wrong
implications of terms and legally wrong determinations to admit
parol evidence.

All of those legal errors were consistently

applied and compounded throughout the trial to the disadvantage
of the Baldwins.

Although Plaintiff's counsel has been artful in
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attempting to couch both the findings and the conclusions in
terms of equity, to shield this injustice from appellate review,
the decision below is internally contradictory and contravenes
every established rule of contract interpretation.
cannot be both ambiguous and unambiguous.

This contract

If it is unambiguous,

there is no basis for mixing and matching terms from the 1984
contract.

If it is ambiguous, then both sides should be allowed

to introduce parol evidence on the issues and the jury should
have been allowed to find the intention of the parties.

Whether

it is ambiguous or unambiguous, no court is ever justified in
arbitrarily ignoring contract clauses like the integration clause
and the 'compliance with law' clause of the 1992 agreement.
The decision below represents both bad law and inequity and
must be reversed.1

x

In one of Plaintiff's footnotes they assert that

Judge Tibbs has been personally attacked in the prior
brief.

As a result of that assertion, we have re-read

that brief and do not believe that any such personal
attacks occur, although Judge Tibbs is mentioned as
being the author of the bad decision below.

The

undersigned counsel have nothing but the highest
personal regard for Judge Tibbs and specifically
believes that Judge Tibbs is a fine human being.

We

further have nothing but respect for his judicial
office.

Nonetheless, we can see no way to justify his

decision based on principles of law and therefore must
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The court below was requested to grant summary judgment for
the Baldwins and would have been justified in doing so.

The

court below received a motion for dismissal under Rule 41(b) at
the appropriate time in the case.
justified.

That motion was similarly

In light of the fact that Plaintiff's position is

untenable as a matter of law, this court is justified, and is
hereby requested to reverse the decision below and enter judgment
in favor of the Baldwins dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with
prejudice and awarding Baldwins' costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to paragraph 13 of the 1992 agreement.
DATED this?>C) * day of February, 1997.

TIMOTHY MI^DEIT-WHrLARDSaN, for:
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants

vigorously oppose it
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